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Abstract 
 
There is a growing interest, notably in development economics, in extending 
project evaluation methods to the evaluation of multiple interventions 
(“programs”). In program evaluations one is interested in the aggregate impact of 
a program rather than the effect on individual beneficiaries. In many situations 
randomized controlled trials cannot identify this impact. We propose a measure of 
program impact, the total program effect (TPE), which is a generalization of the 
treatment effect on the treated (ATET). We show how the TPE can be estimated.  
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Evaluation of Development Policy: 
Treatment versus Program Effects 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Experimental techniques for impact evaluation presuppose that the intervention is well-
defined: the “project” is limited in space and scope (e.g. Duflo et al., 2008). However, 
increasingly governments, NGOs and donor agencies are interested in evaluating the 
effect of heterogeneous interventions such as sector-wide health and education programs. 
A dichotomous distinction between treatment and control groups is then impossible. For 
example, a program in the education sector may involve activities such as school building, 
teacher training and supply of textbooks. Typically all communities are affected in some 
way by the program, but they may differ dramatically in what interventions they are 
exposed to and the extent of that exposure. 
  
The impact of the program cannot simply be calculated on the basis of the results of 
randomized controlled trials (RCTs). This runs into well known problems of external 
validity (Bracht and Glass, 1968, Deaton, 2008, Ravallion, 2009, Rodrik, 2009, Imbens 
2009, Banerjee and Duflo, 2009) even if the intervention is homogeneous. In addition, if 
the interventions are heterogeneous it is not even clear how one would aggregate the 
results of various RCTs. One can, however, modify project evaluation techniques to 
make them suitable for a sector-wide context. This would involve drawing a 
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representative sample of beneficiaries (e.g. households, schools, or communities) and 
collecting data on the combination of interventions experienced by each beneficiary and 
other possible determinants of the outcome variables of interest. Regression techniques 
can then be used to estimate the impact of the various interventions and from this an 
aggregate impact of the program can be derived.2  
 
Clearly, the intervention variables included in the regression as explanatory variables 
may be endogenous. For example, an unobserved variable such as the political 
preferences of the community may affect both the impact variable of interest and the 
intervention. Similarly, the impact of the intervention may differ across beneficiaries and 
the allocation of interventions across beneficiaries may in part be based on such impact 
heterogeneity, either through self-selection or through the allocation decisions of program 
officials. In either case the intervention variables would be endogenous. 
 
If the endogeneity is due to impact heterogeneity (“selection on the gain”, Heckman et al., 
2006) then this should be incorporated in an estimate of the program effect. (For projects 
this makes ATET, the average treatment effect on the treated, a much more relevant 
parameter than ATE, the average treatment effect in the population, as we will see 
below.) 
  
In the next section we propose a measure of program impact, the total program effect 
(TPE), which is a generalization of the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET). In 
section 3 we show how the TPE can be estimated using data representative for the 
                                                 
2 This approach is discussed in World Bank (2006) and Elbers et al. (2009). 
4 
 
population of interest. Correlation between program variables and the controls is 
considered in section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Impact evaluation and selection effects  
 
Consider the following model:  
  it t it i it i ity c P X         (1) 
where y measures an outcome of interest, in this paper taken to be a scalar; t = 0, 1 is the 
time of measurement; and 1,...,i n  denotes cases sampled randomly from the population 
of interest. The P-variables measure the interventions to be evaluated. They can either be 
binary variables or multi-valued (discrete or continuous) variables. tc  denotes a time 
fixed effect, X observed other determinants of y, i  represents the combined effects of 
unobserved characteristics (assumed to be time invariant for simplicity) and   is the error 
term, assumed independent over time.  Since we allow for impact heterogeneity the 
coefficients i  are case-specific.  
 
We will use the term project evaluation for the special case when there is only a single, 
binary P-variable, with the value 0 if i belongs to the control group and 1 for the 
treatment group and if there are no covariates. If P is multi-valued or if there are multiple 
P-variables or if outcomes depend on covariates X we will refer to the intervention as a 
program.  
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We assume that P, X and   are not correlated with the error term: , ,it it i itP X   . 
However, we allow for two types of selection effects: itP  may be correlated with i  and 
with the unobserved case characteristics i . Initially we assume that P and X are not 
correlated. This assumption will be relaxed in section 3.  
 
Consider first the case of treatment homogeneity: , all  (in the population).i i   If 
treatment is exogenous ( ,it it it i itP X u     ), as in a randomized control trial (RCT), 
then OLS estimation of (1) will produce an unbiased estimate of  , which in this case 
clearly is the parameter of interest. In the special case of project impact evaluation  
measures the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET) which then equals the 
average treatment effect (ATE).       
 
If treatment is endogenous in the sense of “selection on the level”, i.e. if itP  or itX  is 
correlated with the unobserved case characteristics i , the equation can be estimated in 
first differences:  
 ,i i i iy P X           (2) 
where 1 0.c c    Since differencing eliminates the source of the endogeneity, OLS 
estimation of (2) will produce an unbiased estimate of .  
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Next consider the case of treatment heterogeneity: the coefficients i  differ across cases.3 
The differenced equation now reads: 
 ( )
.
i i i i i
i i i i i
i i i
y P X
P X P
P X u
   
     
  
       
         
     
 (3) 
The coefficients of the last equation can be estimated with OLS if ( ,i iP X  ) are not 
correlated with the i . Suppose, however, that there is “selection on the gain”, because of 
self-selection (for example, those with high impact effects i  choose to participate), 
because program staff choose the values of itP  on the basis of i  or because those who 
expect to be assigned treatment change their behavior in response. This is the case of 
essential heterogeneity (Heckman 1997, Heckman et al., 2006) where itP  is correlated 
with i . iP  is then endogenous in (3) and the OLS estimate of   will, of course, be 
biased: 
 ( ) .i i i i i i iE y P X E P P X                       
Instrumentation cannot solve the problem (Heckman, 1997; Deaton, 2008): an instrument 
correlated with iP  will also be correlated with .iu   
 
The literature suggests that in this case it may be possible to estimate the ATE for a 
subgroup. An example is the local average treatment effect (LATE), developed by 
Imbens and Angrist (1994). While Imbens (2009) suggests with the title of his paper 
                                                 
3 Clearly, heterogeneity can also affect  and  but here we restrict the analysis to -heterogeneity.     
 To take care of other types of heterogeneity requires different methods. For example, α-heterogeneity can 
be dealt with by differencing the equation once more (“triple differencing”, as in e.g. Ravallion et al., 2005).  
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(“LATE or Nothing”) that there is no alternative to the LATE, we argue that in many 
cases not even the (global) ATE is the parameter of interest. Depending on the question 
the impact evaluation is supposed to address we consider three possibilities.  
 
First, the evaluator may want to estimate the effect of a marginal change in P for a 
randomly selected case i. In this case  is indeed the appropriate parameter. This case is 
rather special. It is relevant in an ex post evaluation if in the population assignments P  
were in fact random (i.e. independent of i ) in the evaluation period. Similarly, an 
estimate of   is useful ex ante if the policy maker (a) intends to make future assignments 
P either random or universal ( for all iP P i ) and (b) is in fact able to do so. This is the 
case in Imbens’ (2009) example where the policy question is what the effect would be of 
a reduction in class size in all California schools.  
 
Secondly, suppose the question was (ex post) what impact was achieved with a non-
randomly assigned program .P  This is a central question in policy evaluations: tax 
payers and policy makers want to know what interventions have actually achieved rather 
than what they could have achieved if designed differently, e.g. if targeted on a particular 
group. This calls for an estimate of [ ]i iE P , which we will call the total program effect 
(TPE), the average (per case) effect of the program, inclusive of selectivity in the 
placement of program interventions or any unobserved responses by intended 
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beneficiaries resulting in a correlation between iP  and i .4 It is instructive to define the 
following weighted average of impact parameters ji  
  [ ] / [ ]j j j ji i iE P E P     
where the weights are the changes in the jiP . If iP  and i  are correlated this weighted 
impact parameter will differ from the unweighted counterpart j jiE  . Note that 
TPE j ji
j
E P   and that in the case of a project (i.e., a single, binary program 
variable iP ) the TPE is related to the average treatment effect on the treated 
iATET ( | 1)iE P    as  
 TPE ATET .iE P    
 
In an RCT the evaluator may be able to ensure that iP  and i  are independent and 
thereby obtain an estimate of . However, since in the program iP  and i  will usually 
not be independent     so that the RCT result cannot be used to estimate the 
parameter of interest, the TPE. This is another way in which external validity can fail. 
Conversely, to the extent that participation in the RCT mimics real life participation in 
the program then, and only then, the RCT results can be used to estimate the program 
effect.    
 
Finally, suppose the policy maker wants to estimate ex ante the impact of a program P 
and random or universal assignment is either not desirable or not feasible.5 If future 
                                                 
4 If the endogenous responses are observed they result in a correlation of P and X. This is considered in 
section 4.    
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assignments are expected to be similar to past assignments then, again, what is required is 
an estimate of [ ]i iE P , if necessary adjusted for differences in program size and scope. 
Note that the issue is not only whether the results of an RCT in, say, some village in 
Western Kenya can be generalized to a different context.6 In addition, the issue is 
whether universal or random assignment is feasible or even desirable.   
 
3. Estimation of the Total Program Effect  
 
How can [ ]i iE P  be estimated? Take conditional expectations in equation (3):7 
[ | , ] [ | , ]i i i i i i i iE y P X PE P X X            
and use a linear approximation for the conditional expectation of i : 8 
 
0 1 2[ | , ] .
j j j k j
i i i k i i
k
E P X P X           

 
This gives  
 0 1 2
, ,
[ | , ] T j j j k j j ji i i i i k i i i i
j j k j
E y P X X P P P P X                    

 (4) 
                                                                                                                                                 
5 Deaton (2008) gives the example of a non-monolithic public sector where random assignments made by 
the central government (e.g. the Ministry of Education) are partly offset by induced changes in allocations 
by local or provincial governments.  Similarly, the political economy may be such that the central 
government is unable to prevent allocations being diverted to favored ethnic or political groups. In either 
case Pi may be correlated with βi.  
6 See Deaton (2008) on the external validity of RCTs.  
7 Here we condition on differences. Conditioning on the levels 0 1 0 1, , ,i i i iX X P P leads to similar results. 
8 Higher-order approximations to [ | , ]ji i iE P X   would not affect the conclusion: one would simply 
include more terms in the regression of equation (4). 
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Hence one can regress iy  on 
,  and the interaction terms of  with  and i i i i iP X P P X     9 and use the estimated 
coefficients 0 1 2ˆ ˆ ˆ, ,
j j j
k l    to estimate the total program effect as 
0 1 2
,
ˆ ˆ ˆTPE [ ] j j j k j j ji i i k i i i i
j j k j
E P P P P P X   

            

 
and the weighted average j as: 
  
0 1 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ
.
j j j k j j j
i k i i i i
j kj
j
i
P P P P X
P
  
 
      
 
  
  
where the bars denote means taken over the population of interest.  
 
Note that the estimated TPE is linear in the ˆ parameters so its standard error can be 
obtained straightforwardly from the covariance matrix of the OLS-coefficients. 
  
It is instructive to consider the special case of a project, e.g. an RCT: 
   .i i i iy P         
In this case the quadratic approximation of [ | ]i iE y P   is exact (and in fact linear): 
 
0 1[ | ] [ | 1] (1 ) [ | 0]i i i i i i i i i iE P P PE P P E P                 
Substitution in the regression equation gives 
[ | ] [ | 1]i i i i iE y P E P P         
so that an OLS regression of on i iy P   gives an unbiased estimate of the ATET . 
                                                 
9 Obviously, combining the terms k jj kP P   and j kk jP P  . 
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4. Correlation between P and X 
 
Das et al. (2004, 2007) show that in primary schools in Zambian changes in P, e.g. 
teacher absenteeism as a result of HIV/AIDS, induce changes in parental inputs. Not all 
such inputs will be observed (e.g. additional parental help with homework will probably 
not be recorded); itP  will then be correlated with i  and this we have already considered 
in the previous section. Conversely, if the parental input is observed then itP  will be 
correlated with itX .
10 In that case the approach of section 3 would identify the direct 
effect of P, but not its total effect (including the indirect effect through induced changes 
in X).  
 
More generally, from (1) it follows that  
.i i i iE y E P E X                (5) 
If iX is caused by iP  in the sense that:  
k k k k
i i iX P v               (6) 
where iv  is independent of iP , then the TPE as defined in section 2 would miss the 
induced effect 
,
.k k jj i
j k
E P     In this case iy should be regressed on a quadratic 
function of  iP  but not on terms involving iX . This gives 
0 2 1 2
,
( ) ( ) ( ) .j j j j k k k j j m j k ji k j i k k m i ij k kj j k m
E y E P E P P                           
                                                 
10 This correlation was ruled out in sections 2 and 3. 
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The TPE can now be estimated as  
 
0 2 1 2
ˆ ˆ
where  and .
j j jk k j
i i i
j j k
j j j k k k jk j m j
k j k k mk k m
TPE A P B P P
A B       

    
    
 
  
 It may be desirable to decompose the TPE into the direct effect of P and the indirect 
effect (via induced changes in X). This can be done as follows. First, estimate the TPE in 
the same way as in section 3, i.e. by estimating (5) using the approximation 
0 1 2[ | , ] .
j j j k j
i i i k i i
k
E P X P X           

This gives an estimate of the direct effect, 
 
i iEP . According to (6) the indirect effect is 
  
,
.
k k j
j i
j k
P    
An estimate of   is already available and (6) can be estimated to obtain estimates of . 
This gives the decomposition: 
   
,
.
k k j
ji i i
j k
TPE EP P             (7) 
If causality is in the reverse direction, from X to P, then there is no need to amend the 
section 3 estimate of the TPE since there is no induced change in X. (The asymmetry 
arises because in either case we are interested in the impact of changes in P, not in the 
impact of changes in X.) 
 
In the general case where the direction of causality is not known we can still use equation 
(7). However, since the error term  jiv  in (6) will be correlated with iP    cannot be 
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estimated with OLS. Estimation of the program effect then requires instruments for P 
when estimating equation (6).11 
 
3.  Conclusion 
 
Policy makers, NGOs and donor agencies are under increasing pressure to demonstrate 
the effectiveness of their program activities. At the same time there is a growing interest 
in using randomized controlled trials (RCTs) for impact evaluation of projects. This 
raises the question to what extent RCTs can be used to evaluate programs, for instance by 
aggregating the impact of the projects that constitute the program. This is particularly 
relevant for the evaluation of budget support which is used to finance a wide variety of 
different activities. 
 
Unfortunately, the scope for using RCTs in this context is quite limited: since “program 
assignment” is typically non-random by design or necessity, effects established by an 
RCT are not directly relevant for population-wide programs, notably under treatment 
heterogeneity. In addition, many policy activities cannot be summarized by a binary 
treatment variable. For example, what matters in an education program is not just 
whether a school receives textbooks but also how many. 
 
In this paper we have discussed when RCT estimates can be used in program evaluation. 
An RCT with compulsory assignment will produce an estimate of the average treatment 
                                                 
11 If there are no instruments for P in (6) but there are instruments for X in the reverse relation (P as a linear 
function of X) then - depending on the exclusion restrictions - it may be possible to identify the 
 coefficients through 2SLS.  
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effect (ATE) in the population from which the RCT sample was drawn. This is also the 
parameter of interest for an evaluation of the effect in a larger population, provided the 
sample was representative for that population. This would e.g. be the case if the program 
would be applied universally and involves no externalities.   
 
Usually, however, the interest (either ex post or ex ante) is in the effectiveness of a 
program where random or universal assignment is neither feasible nor desirable. The 
variable of interest is then the total program effect (TPE) introduced in this paper. We 
have shown how and under what conditions the TPE can be estimated in the presence of 
selection effects.  
15 
 
References 
 
Banerjee, Abhijit V. and Esther Duflo (2008), ‘The Experimental Approach to 
Development Economics’, NBER Working Paper 14467.  
 
Bracht, Glenn H. and Glass, Gene V. (1968), ‘The External Validity of Experiments’, 
American Education Research Journal, vol. 5, pp. 437-474. 
 
Das, Jishnu, Stefan Dercon, James Habyarimana, Pramila Krishnan (2004), ‘When Can 
School Inputs Improve Test Scores?’, Policy Research Working Paper, World Bank. 
 
Das, Jishnu, Stefan Dercon, James Habyarimana, Pramila Krishnan (2007), ‘Teacher 
Shocks and Student Learning: Evidence from Zambia’, Journal of Human Resources, vol. 
42, pp. 820-862.  
 
Deaton, Angus (2008), ‘Instruments for Development: Randomization in the Tropics, and 
the Search for the Elusive Keys to Economic Development’, NBER Working Paper 
14690. 
 
Duflo, Esther, Rachel Glennerster and Michael Kremer (2008), ‘Using Randomization in 
Development Economics Research: a Toolkit’, in T. Paul Schultz and John Strauss (eds.), 
Handbook of Development Economics, Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 3895-3962. 
 
Elbers, Chris, Jan Willem Gunning and Kobus de Hoop (2009), ‘Assessing Sector-Wide 
Programs with Statistical Impact Evaluation: a Methodological Proposal’, World 
Development, vol. 37, 2009, pp. 513-520. 
 
Heckman, James J., Sergio Urzua and Edward J. Vytlacil (2006), ‘Understanding 
Instrumental Variables with Essential Heterogeneity’, NBER Working Paper 12574. 
 
Heckman James J. (1997), ‘Instrumental Variables: a Study of Implicit Behavioral 
Assumptions Used in Making Program Evaluations’,  Journal of Human Resources, vol. 
32, pp. 441-462. 
 
Imbens, Guido W. (2009), ‘Better LATE than Nothing: Some Comments on Deaton 
(2009) and Heckman and Urzua (2009)’, NBER Working Paper 14896. 
 
Imbens, Guido W. and Joshua D. Angrist (1994), ‘Identification and Estimation of Local 
Average Treatment Effects’, Econometrica, vol. 62, pp. 467-476. 
 
Ravallion, Martin, Emanuela Galasso, Teodoro Lazo, and Ernesto Philipp (2005),  
‘What Can Ex-Participants Reveal about a Program's Impact?’, Journal of Human 
Resources, vol. 40, pp. 208-230.  
 
Ravallion, Martin (2009), ‘Evaluation in the Practice of Development’, World Bank 
Research Observer, vol. 24, pp. 29-53. 
 
16 
 
Rodrik, Dani (2008), ‘The New Development Economics: We Shall Experiment But How 
Shall We Learn?’, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, HKS 
Working Paper RWP 08-055. 
 
World Bank (2006), Impact Evaluation: the Experience of the Independent 
Evaluation Group of the World Bank. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
